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ABSTRACT 
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Literature Review 
In writing my thesis, I must first examine the main theories of forgiveness. With my 
research, I have discovered two main accounts of forgiveness: the relinquishing of resentment 
account and forgoing punishment account. Jeffrie G. Murphy, one of the main advocates along 
with Pamela Hieronymi for the relinquishing of resentment account, argues that forgiveness is 
solely a feeling and change of attitude, it is letting go of one’s negative feelings towards their 
wrongdoer and replacing them with neutral or positive feelings. When doing so, one must also 
fulfill three main respect conditions: 1) self-respect, 2) respect for the wrongdoer as a moral agent, 
and 3) respect for the moral laws (Hieronymi 2001, Murphy 2008). These essential conditions 
ensure that the victim is not forgiving on unfounded or poor reasons, for the victim must continue 
to respect themselves as an individual which ought not to be wronged, continue to respect the 
wrongdoer as someone who could have acted differently, and continue to hold that the action was 
indeed wrong (Murphy 2003). As long as these three conditions remain intact and the victim lets 
go of his resentment towards his wrongdoer, forgiveness has occurred.  
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 Conversely, Leo Zaibert poses an account of forgiveness that is quite the opposite. Zaibert 
poses a theory of forgiveness which depends only on the victim’s actions towards the wrongdoer. 
In this theory, how the victim feels towards the wrongdoer is irrelevant to whether forgiveness has 
occurred, for the only factor of importance is how the victim acts – specifically that the victim 
forswears punishment (Zaibert 2009). Thus, to forgive, all one must do is not punish their 
wrongdoer, whether that be social or criminally.  
 I find the main accounts for forgiveness to be lacking and not reflective of the truth of 
things. My solution to these stark contrasts is that forgiveness must be both feeling and action; one 
without the other is simply incomplete forgiveness. I will argue that a wrong conveys a message 
to the victim from the wrongdoer that the victim is less than the wrongdoer. To reestablish the 
equality between the two parties, the wrongdoer must sincerely repent to the victim, thus 
extinguishing their message and severing themselves from the wrong. In acknowledging this 
change of heart and removing the threat, the victim is now able to relinquish their resentment and 
other negative sentiments.  
I further add a constructive element to this theory, influenced by Daniel Philpott’s and Luke 
Russell’s respective accounts of forgiveness, stating that the victim, in changing her actions, must 
reaccept the wrongdoer into the moral community and reestablish a relationship with the 
wrongdoer (Philpott 2013, Russell 2016). In reestablishing a relationship, I do not mean that the 
exact same relationship must resume, for it would be ridiculous to advocate for a victim of abuse 
to go back to their abuser after forgiving them. However, some relationship must be formed that 
is not “victim” and “wrongdoer,” whether it be friends or acquaintances is up to the victim. In 
summation, I will pose an account of forgiveness that requires both a change of emotion and action, 
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while maintaining the three respect conditions, requiring repentance, and adding a constructive 
element.  
Once completely defining my account of forgiveness, I am able to move on to define 
punishment. Here, I will use David Boonin’s definition of punishment as an authorized, 
reprobative, retributive, intentional harm (Boonin 2008). After evaluating Boonin’s definition, I 
will offer my critique of his using the term “retributive” and replace it with “reactive,” ensuring 
the separation from this definition from the retributivist justifications for punishment. Once the 
definition of punishment is laid out, I will demonstrate how this applies to social punishment. In 
doing this, I bridge the gap between criminal and social punishment, showing that the two are 
relatively similar.  
Finally, I will be able to examine the relationship between forgiveness and punishment, 
which I have not yet discovered for myself. Here too Zaibert and Murphy find themselves at odds, 
for while Murphy believes forgiveness and punishment to be compatible when punishing for 
reasons beyond resentment, Zaibert finds them to always be incompatible (Murphy 2008, Zaibert 
2012). One possible avenue to take is Philpott’s account of forgiveness as restoring justice. Philpott 
argues that since forgiveness removes the threat of the wrongdoing, it also restores justice between 
the wrongdoer and victim, making punishment obsolete (Philpott 2013). 
Thesis Statement 
In this thesis, I will create and articulate account of forgiveness and punishment which I 
find to be the most accurate and truthful in order to define the relationship, if any, between 
forgiveness and punishment to answer my central question of whether one can forgive while 
endorsing punishment. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Throughout this thesis I will employ two main philosophical methods: conceptual analysis 
and the method of reflective equilibrium. Using conceptual analysis, I will examine the current 
accounts of forgiveness and punishment to discover their accomplishments and/or faults. The 
method of reflective equilibrium will be used when I pose my own theories of forgiveness, 
punishment, and their relationship. Here, I will test real world examples and scenarios against my 
theory to determine if it is truly the best conception. 
Project Description 
My main focus in this thesis is the relationship between forgiveness and punishment, or, 
more specifically, whether one can forgive and punish at the same time. In order to do this, I will 
examine the various theories of forgiveness in order to develop my personal theory of forgiveness 
through combining what I find to be the strong points of the top forgiveness theories into one 
cohesive theory. The new theory of forgiveness that I will propose allows for both emotion and 
action play equal roles in the process of forgiveness. Unlike Jeffrie G. Murphy and Leo Zaibert, 
who solely focus on either emotion or action, I believe that the two are both essential to forgiving 
and further add constructive and conditional elements of forgiveness. After defending my account 
of forgiveness, I will move into defining punishment, both criminal and social, in order to examine 
the relationship, if any, between forgiveness and punishment.  
It is my goal at the end of this paper to have created a conception of forgiveness that most 
closely aligns with the truth, in order to accurately represent the relationship between forgiveness 
and punishment, showing either that they are compatible, incompatible, or how their relationship 
is complicated. My account of the relationship between forgiveness and punishment will help us 
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understand our human condition, how to have flourishing relationships, and even poses policy 
implications.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Amber Guyger, an off-duty police officer, mistakenly walked into the wrong apartment 
after a 13.5-hour shift, noticed the door was unlocked, and found a man on the couch. Thinking it 
was an intruder, she shot to kill the man, Botham Jean. Soon after, she realized this was not her 
apartment, this was his. After a long trial with the tension of a white off-duty officer shooting an 
unarmed black man in his own home, she was sentenced to prison for 10 years. While many were 
outraged at the short sentence compared to those received by many black criminals, Botham’s 18-
year-old brother, Brandt Jean, stunned the nation. Speaking to Amber and the courtroom, he states 
“if you truly are sorry…I forgive you.” This utterance shocked the courtroom, but he continued to 
tell her “I love you just like anyone else, and I’m not going to say I hope you rot and die just like 
my brother did, but I personally want the best for you…I don’t even want you to go to jail.” Shortly 
after, he begged the judge to hug his brother’s killer, which she allowed. Upon their long embrace, 
he again tells her he forgives her and begins praying aloud over her. You can hear their cries and 
the crying of others in the courtroom.  
 This stunning act of forgiveness leads to questions of the extent of forgiveness and its 
relationship to punishment. Primarily, what is the relationship between punishment and 
forgiveness? In forgiving Amber, must Brandt have wished her no punishment, or could he endorse 
punishment while forgiving?  
 Along with these questions relating to the relationship of forgiveness and punishment, 
further questions of forgiveness and repentance will be answered on the way. Was Brandt forgiving 
if he required her sincere apology, or must forgiveness be unconditional? Did Brandt go beyond 
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forgiveness when wishing her the best, or is that required in forgiveness? Does Amber’s repentant 
state warrant Brandt’s wish for no punishment? Should a repentant wrongdoer be punished?  
 In this thesis, I hope to answer these questions through developing a comprehensive 
account of forgiveness, defining punishment, and examining the compatibility, if any, between the 
two. Examining these three topics will allow me to answer my central question of whether one can 
forgive while endorsing or enacting punishment. My account of the compatibility between 
punishment and forgiveness can have possible policy implications, help uncover how to have 
flourishing and virtuous relationships, and help us understand our human condition.  
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CHAPTER I 
HARM, WRONG, AND NEGATIVE REACTIVE ATTITUDES 
 
 
Before we dissect what we are doing, or ought to be doing, when we forgive, we must look 
into the nature of the thing that is to be forgiven. In this section, I will define and differentiate 
between wrong and harm, in order to determine which of the two, or both, are involved in 
forgiveness. When discussing wrongdoing, it is often mistaken for harm. This common confusion 
makes it essential to differentiate the two and provide definitions for both in order to accurately 
and truthfully discuss forgiveness and punishment. After this, I will define moral injury and 
reactive attitudes, which will lead into my discussion of forgiveness, for ultimately I will argue 
that forgiveness, among other things, involves the overcoming of the reactive attitudes caused by 
moral injury.  
Harm 
Harm, commonly mistaken as wrong, is a damage to one’s physical body, psychology, 
resources, future, or capabilities, not reliant upon wrong. Harms include any damage incurred 
by others, your own actions, or natural causes. Using the previous case of Amber Guyger and 
Botham Jean, Amber harmed Botham in killing him and taking away his future, harmed his family 
by the loss of a loved one and the pain that entails, harmed any of Botham’s dependents, and may 
have even harmed, to a lesser extent, Botham’s coworkers.  
Harms do not have to cause merely physical damage, for injuring a person’s wellbeing also 
includes damaging one’s “psychological state, capacities to function, life plans, or resources…we 
take this person to have entitlement” (Hampton 1992 1662). Take for example if your exclusive 
romantic partner were to have a secret affair, which you discover upon coming to your shared 
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home to see them together in your bed. The harm incurred here is the damage to your ability to 
trust and have future fruitful relationships after being witness to such an affair, the possible loss of 
a future with this person, and maybe even damage to your financial resources if you are forced to 
find a new place to live. While there was no physical damage to you, there was severe 
psychological damage and possible relational and resource damage. All of these damages count as 
harms. 
Thus, harms are diminishments of one’s welfare or an “interference in a person’s well-
being” (Hampton 1992 1662). A harmful action is an action which sets the victim back in his own 
interests, through physical, mental, and financial damage and diminishment of one’s capabilities 
or future plans. Notice harms are not morally rich, for they do not concern themselves with 
normative questions, questions of culpability, or questions of wrongdoing. Rather, they are merely 
damages to a person’s wellbeing.  
Wrong 
Conversely, a wrong is a moral violation that communicates a diminishment or lack 
of respect for one’s guaranteed rights or worth, causing moral injury. Using Kant, we know 
that all humans are deserving and ought to be guaranteed equal, permanent, and infinite worth, 
meaning no human is above another (Kant Grounding…). However, wrongs communicate the 
opposite, for they elevate the wrongdoer and lower the victim in the eyes of the wrongdoer, victim, 
and possibly others, for wrongdoing is “an affront to the victim’s value or dignity” (Hampton 1992 
1666). Using Amber Guyger’s case, her shooting and killing Botham elevates Amber above 
Botham as someone who can control his life and death and communicates that her life is superior 
to Botham’s life.      
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While the victim’s moral worth is not in fact lowered by wrongdoing, it appears to be due 
to the treatment he receives. Thus, his worth may be diminished in the eyes of others, but it is not 
actually lowered or removed, for it is a false message that wrongdoing communicates. This can be 
seen most clearly in cases of rape, for rapists believe they have a right over another person’s body, 
rights, and dignity, and often victims of rape feel shame or a lack of worth after enduring such a 
horrific event. While the victim’s worth has not actually been removed, it feels as though it has 
through the message of disrespect the wrong communicates. The violation of the victim’s rights 
and worth can cause her to feel inferior to her wrongdoer, and in some societies may even cause 
others to view her as lower in worth or dignity; however, her real worth has not been damaged, for 
it is an undamageable thing. She still maintains all of her rights, worth, and dignity even though 
they have been terribly violated through the message of the wrong. As expressed through these 
examples, wrongs “violate a moral standard applicable in the circumstances” which “say[s], and 
attempt[s] to represent” the victim as “having some value less than that which the Kantian theory 
of value would attribute” (Hampton 1992 1666, 1674). 
Further, for an act to be a wrong, it must be culpable, meaning it cannot be excused. For a 
person to be a wrongdoer, they must be culpable for the wrong they committed. Thus, someone 
who is forced at gunpoint to commit a moral crime cannot be held fully responsible, for he had 
little choice in the matter, and does not qualify as wrongdoers due to his lack of freedom in acting. 
While wrongs have to be culpable, this does not mean that the message of disrespect has to be 
intended, but rather that the person was culpable in committing the act. For example, Amber 
Guyger may not have meant to have sent the severe message of disrespect to Botham Jean, for she 
thought Botham was an intruder in her home, yet the message was still sent. While Amber’s state 
of mind was not to shoot and kill an innocent man, she still acted with awful carelessness in making 
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her decision to shoot. Amber is culpable for her actions because she in fact chose to shoot him, 
thus she committed a wrong and sent a message of severe disrespect through her careless disregard 
for his life. Often people do not explicitly mean to communicate a victim’s lack of worth when 
wronging them, but they still send the message regardless of the intent. Wrongs, in and of 
themselves, send the message of disrespect through their treatment of the victim as being lower in 
value.  
Philosophers such as Jeffrey M. Blustein do not agree with me that all wrongs send a 
message of disrespect. He argues that while you “can be wronged by actions that do not confront 
[you] as their target,” this wrong “cannot insult [you]” (Blustein 2016 29). It is important to note 
that Blustein uses the word ‘insult’ to extend to “reach to core ingredients of the self and the bases 
of self-respect” (Blustein 31). This means that these wrongs, in which the victim was not a target, 
do not communicate a victim’s lack of Kantian worth. As Blustein would argue, if a car thief were 
to steal your car not because it is yours but because it happened to be there at the right place and 
time, the wrongdoer would not be communicating your lack of worth through his wrong. Rather, 
he would merely be wronging you without any such communication or insult. Insulting wrongs, 
or wrongs that communicate disrespect, have a “personal nature,” as he argues, while this example 
does not (Blustein 2016 30).  Thus, according to Blustein, it is not the case that all wrongs 
communicate a lack of worth.  
Blustein is mistaken, however. All wrongs, regardless if the victim was specifically 
targeted or not, communicate disrespect and a lack of worth. The car thief in the previous example 
still saw his victim as less important and worthy than himself, for he viewed the victim’s property 
as being something he was entitled to take. The thief viewed himself as superior to his victim 
without directly knowing or targeting the certain victim. Thus, the disrespectful message that 
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wrongs send still applies in situations where the victim is unknown or unspecified to the 
wrongdoer. While adding a personal connection to wrongs may make them more hurtful, it does 
not change whether a message of disrespect was sent or not. All wrongs send a message of the 
victim’s lack of worth, no matter if you know your victim or not. Wrongs take it that moral codes 
either do not apply to themselves, in that they are above it, or do not apply to the victim, in that 
victims are below it. Wrongs will always communicate a lack of worth and respect, for they are 
disrespectful. 
Amber Guyger both wrongs and harms Botham Jean. But, it is important to note that not 
all wrongdoing must cause or involve harm. Take for example an attempted murder in which the 
almost murdered person was unaware that the attempt was even made. While he was not harmed 
since it was a failed attempt that he had no knowledge of, a wrong still occurred. There was still a 
wrong because the attempted murderer still sends a message of inferiority and disrespect to the 
victim, even though the victim may never know. Thus, the two may exist conjunctly or separately 
from each other. 
While wrongs are distinct from harms, wrongs do cause a kind of injury, which Jean 
Hampton calls a moral injury. Hampton defines moral injury as “damage to the realization of 
a victim’s value, or damage to the acknowledgement of a victim’s value” which is caused by 
wrongs, i.e. “through behavior whose meaning is such that the victim is diminished in value” 
(Hampton 1992 1679). As explained earlier, wrongdoing communicates a false message of 
diminished dignity, worth, or value in the victim while sending a message of superiority on behalf 
of the wrongdoer. This message causes the victim and possibly others to view the victim as in fact 
having a diminished value, leading to moral injury. Wrongdoing causes moral injury due to the 
wrongdoer “treat[ing] [the victim] in a way that is precluded by that person’s value, and/or by 
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representing him as worth far less than his actual value” (Hampton 1992 1677). This moral injury, 
or diminishment in perceived value, can go as far as to cause the victim to believe he is of lesser 
value, causing further psychological harm to the victim. Anytime there is wrongdoing, there is a 
moral injury due to the wrong’s message.   
Forgiveness deals with wrongs and thus moral injuries rather than harms. It would not 
make sense for a victim to feel the need to forgive someone who had accidentally fallen and pushed 
her, but it does make sense for a victim to forgive someone who had pushed her on purpose or 
negligently. When forgiving, we are forgiving a moral injury and a wrong. The message of 
disrespect the wrongdoing sends is what warrants the need for forgiveness more than a mere harm. 
Negative Reactive Attitudes  
Now that we have analyzed wrongs and harms and determined that forgiveness has to do 
with wrongdoings and their moral injuries, we must evaluate what happens next. That is, what 
leads us on the path of forgiveness? In this section I will reveal that negative reactive attitudes are 
the responses to moral injuries in order to explain the common view that forgiveness must 
overcome these negative reactive attitudes. However, before further discussion we must define 
negative reactive attitudes.  
Negative Reactive Attitudes 
Negative reactive attitudes include reactions such as resentment, anger, disappointment, 
indignation, and hate, which are all reactions to the perceived ill will of others towards oneself 
(Strawson 1962). Negative reactive attitudes involve four elements: judgement, attitude, 
expectation, and reaction. When forming negative reactive attitudes, we make judgements about 
other’s actions and their expression of ill will. Our judgements stem from our expectations of 
others to treat us differently. These expectations are relationship-dependent, as it is evident that 
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one expects much higher standard of action and care for their partner than a stranger. To illustrate, 
if you find yourself as the topic of gossip amongst your close family and friends, you make a 
judgement that those persons closest to you ought not to be spreading your private information and 
ridiculing it, thus you see that they have ill will towards you in their gossip. You make the 
judgement that they are wrong in treating you such a way. Then we form a reaction and adopt a 
negative stance towards that person, the wrongdoer. In following from the previous example, from 
your judgement that they are wrong in their treatment of you, you adopt negative attitudes towards 
those persons for their treatment. It is likely that you would feel angry when hearing of their gossip, 
then adopt a longer-lasting feeling of resentment or disappointment towards them.  
It is important to note that anger and resentment are negative reactive attitudes rather than 
negative reactive emotions. This differentiation is essential due to negative reactive attitudes being 
typically longer-lasting and dispositional rather than ever-changing as emotions are. For example, 
when one experiences the emotion of sadness, they likely will feel sad for a shorter time period 
then move on from the event and later feel happy, while when one experiences the attitude of 
resentment, resentment will come in and out of their mind for a long period of time and remain in 
the back, if not forefront, of their mind until that attitude is overcome. Thus, you would hold your 
feelings of resentment and disappointment in their gossip until you had some change of heart or 
motive to work to drop your feelings. In summation, negative reactive attitudes are our 
reactions to perceived ill will of others involving judgement, attitude, expectation, and 
reaction. 
Moral injuries warrant and call for negative reactive attitudes. As Peter Strawson argues, 
reactive attitudes are what it is “to hold people responsible for wrongdoing” and thus moral injury 
(Couto 2016 1311). Negative reactive attitudes intrinsically hold wrongdoers responsible in the 
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sense that they are oppositional, for they are directed towards your wrongdoer. These wrongdoer-
directed negative reactive attitudes that are a response to moral injuries include but are not limited 
to anger, resentment, indignation, hate and disappointment. Negative reactive attitudes are always 
aimed at someone. For example, when you are angry, you are angry at him; when you are 
disappointed, you are disappointed in her. Negative reactive attitudes, in their directedness, 
intrinsically hold the wrongdoer responsible or blames the wrongdoer.  
Jeffrey M. Blustein argues that other emotions and attitudes, such as sadness, which are 
themselves not directed at others, can become directed when “[they] accompan[y] blame” 
(Bluestein 2016 42). He argues that sadness can be how a victim “emotionally registers her blame” 
for the wrongdoing (Blustein 2016 42). However, this cannot be the case. Sadness can never be 
directed at someone, no matter whether I blame or hold someone responsible for my sadness. I can 
be saddened by having my wedding ring stolen and blame the theft for my sadness, however I 
can’t feel sad at the thief. When becoming angry or indignant, possibly due to my sadness, I can 
now have an attitude directed at my wrongdoer. Thus, reactive attitudes are different from other 
attitudes and emotions in that they have an aim and direction.   
Demand 
Further, negative reactive attitudes express a demand in being what it is to hold someone 
responsible for acting wrongly. Negative reactive attitudes “involve an expectation of and demand 
for certain conduct from one another,” namely, they implicitly express a demand for mutual respect 
(Strawson 1974 85). Negative reactive attitudes, when they are legitimate responses to moral 
injury, protest the message of that injury – the message of disrespect – and demand “reciprocal 
relationships of respect be re-established” (Couto 2016 1313).  Thus, the purpose of negative 
reactive attitudes to wrongdoing is to demand equality and mutual respect from the wrongdoer.  
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Resentment  
Many prominent accounts of forgiveness center around or at least involve the overcoming 
of the negative reactive attitude of resentment specifically. As such, we must discuss resentment 
in particular to have a fuller view on what it means and accomplishes. In Murphy and Hampton’s 
book Forgiveness and Mercy, Hampton poses a view of resentment as a result of a victim’s 
insecurity in her own worth and value.  Hampton argues that a resentful victim fears that their 
wrongdoer “is right to think that his status is lower” making the wrongful treatment permissible or 
fears that their wrongdoer “is right to think that his worth can be lowered and that it is permissible 
for him to do so” (Murphy and Hampton 1988 57). Hampton’s view of resentment as “a kind of 
weakness” leads her to argue that forgiveness involves an impersonal protest rather than a personal 
protest (Radzik 2011 2). By this, she argues that victims of wrongdoing must not feel personally 
threatened by the wrongdoing but rather be in defense of moral laws, leading them to feel indignant 
rather than resentful towards their wrongdoers.  
However, I think Hampton is wrong to think that resentment is a form of insecurity about 
one’s Kantian worth. Resentment is a form of protest against a moral injury incurred. Following 
Joseph Butler’s “Upon Resentment and Forgiveness of Injuries,” resentment is “a weapon put into 
our hands” to protest wrongdoing and injustice (Butler 2005 3). The “natural object” or function 
of resentment is to defend against wrongdoing and moral injury. Resentment is intimately 
“connected with a sense of virtue” against such vices; therefore, resentment defends Kantian self-
worth and self-respect (Butler 2005 3). The weapon of resentment need not involve a fear of being 
unworthy, rather it involves knowing and demanding of deserved treatment. Self-respect is “not 
merely a belief but it is also an attitude, which is associated with certain behavioral patterns” such 
as avoidance, when one’s worth is disrespected (Couto 2016 1318). Resentment sends the message 
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that ‘You ought not to have done that to me.’ Resentment protests that treatment, and we do not 
often see protesters as being fearful that their adversary’s belief is true. For example, when looking 
at women involved in women’s marches, one does not look at them and their resentment and think 
they must fear being wrong about their equality. Rather, they perform their knowledge of deserving 
equality through protest, just as a resentful victim does.  
Negative reactive attitudes are both hard to bear and hard to receive. Being a recipient of 
negative reactive attitudes, such as resentment, weighs heavily on one’s consciousness and likely 
brings about shame and guilt if one recognizes the negative reactive attitude are deserved. Being 
subject to someone’s negative reactive attitudes resulting from one’s wrongdoing can cause the 
wrongdoer to view himself, and may cause the community to view him, as morally inferior or 
morally rotten. This may harm the wrongdoer’s self-confidence, relationships, and reputation. The 
shame and guilt that victim’s negative reactive attitudes cause can lead the wrongdoer to 
acknowledge his wrong and even to seek to make amends, thus serving a corrective purpose in 
some cases. Nevertheless, these negative reactive attitudes are hard to receive as they communicate 
a protest and demand against one’s actions. 
Similarly, maintaining negative reactive attitudes is difficult and painful for the victim. 
Even though negative reactive attitudes are a means for the victim to express her demand for 
respect and protest the wrongdoing, they are less than desirable to have. Resentment and other 
negative reactive attitudes are painful to hold onto, for the victim is unable to move on from the 
wrong and continues to let the wrong affect her daily life. Negative reactive attitudes can consume 
a victim’s thoughts and prevent her from experiencing positive attitudes and emotions. Thus, 
victims often seek means by which they can respectively and productively rid themselves of their 
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negative reactive attitudes. My thesis focuses on two means by which victims often move on from 
their negative reactive attitudes – forgiveness and punishment.  
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CHAPTER II 
FORGIVENESS 
 
 
Forgiveness addresses the demand of negative reactive attitudes through its promotion of 
equality and mutual respect. Forgiveness is primarily a respect seeking action taken by the victim 
of a wrong, however forgiveness does not forgo the demand for the redress of moral injuries. 
Rather, forgiveness promotes and continues to issue that demand in another regard. In doing this, 
a victim forgives virtuously only when mutual respect can be reestablished. This following section 
will define the various respect-seeking conditions that must be met in order for forgiveness to 
address the demand of negative reactive attitudes through defining forgiveness as a virtue. Further, 
this chapter will describe how we ought to properly forgive our wrongdoers through overcoming 
negative reactive attitudes and adopting a positive attitude and positive actions towards our 
wrongdoers, revealing further conditions that must be met by the wrongdoer in order to facilitate 
forgiveness.  
Virtue 
In order for forgiving to be virtuous, it must continue to promote the demand of negative 
reactive attitudes – the demand of mutual respect. The aim of forgiveness must be respect seeking.  
Philosophers such as Pamela Hieronymi and Jeffrie G. Murphy recognize that forgiveness must 
be compatible with certain conditions of respect in order for the victim to continue issuing her 
demand of equality. Adopting their model, which will be explained shortly, forgiveness must be 
compatible with self-respect, respect for the wrongdoer as a moral agent, and respect for the moral 
law. Victims of wrongdoing must revise their negative reactive attitudes “while maintaining the 
judgements that occasioned it,” meaning they must continue to hold that they ought not to have 
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been treated that way, that their wrongdoer was capable of not treating them that way, and that 
said treatment is in fact wrong (Hieronymi 2001 538). Thus, forgiveness continues the protest of 
negative reactive attitudes in demanding respect through the maintenance of self-respect, respect 
for the wrongdoer, and respect for moral laws. Due to these conditions, the victim is able to 
virtuously forgive rather than merely condone, justify, pity, or excuse their wrongdoer, for the 
victim is able to hold their judgements that caused their reactive attitudes while continuing to issue 
their demand of mutual respect.  
Self-Respect 
Firstly, forgiveness must defend your self-respect. Forgiveness is directly tied to self-
respect because when being a victim of a moral injury, you adopt a negative reactive attitude and 
protest towards the wrongdoer, demanding a reestablishment of respect between the you and your 
wrongdoer. In order to uphold the condition of self-respect, the victim must hold that she ought 
not to have been treated that way due to her unbounded worth. This demand for self-respect ensures 
that the victim is not forgiving on grounds that she believes she doesn’t deserve better treatment. 
For example, many people in abusive relationships come to see themselves as deserving of that 
treatment. If a victim of abuse were to come to forgive her previous abuser, the victim must realize 
that she did not deserve that treatment due to her own incarnate and infinite worth. If the victim is 
unable to see herself as deserving of respect, the victim is unable to forgive for she would be doing 
something else, such as condoning.  
Respect for Others 
Secondly, the victim must also hold respect for the wrongdoer as a moral agent. As Murphy 
argues, “a hasty readiness to forgive…may reveal a lack of respect, not just for oneself, but for 
others” (Murphy and Hampton 1988 18). You must hold respect for others when forgiving, for if 
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you do not you’re merely pitying, taking mercy on, or excusing the wrongdoer of the act. As argued 
previously, wrongdoing requires culpability, and the victim cannot deny the wrongdoer’s 
culpability when forgiving, for that would be excusing, condoning, or justifying the wrongdoer’s 
action. Further, the victim must not treat their offender like a child who could not have behaved 
otherwise, for this is lacking respect for others as free moral agents with capacities for reason. To 
illustrate, we often hear the phrase ‘boys will be boys’ muttered when hearing of men behaving 
inappropriately towards others and themselves. When adopting the mindset that men can’t help 
themselves but rather are ruled by their testosterone, this excuses men from their actions and 
underestimates their moral agency. If a man behaves aggressively and the victim adopts the 
mindset that ‘boys will be boys,’ the victim is unable to truly and virtuously forgive the aggressor 
due to disrespecting his moral agency to act otherwise. The victim would be excusing and 
condoning the wrongdoing when adopting such a mindset due to “denigrat[ing] the wrongdoer so 
that his claims aren’t a threat” (Hieronymi 200 547). Victims must hold not only self-respect but 
also respect for their wrongdoers in order to virtuously and truly forgive.   
Respect for Moral Law 
Lastly, the final condition that victims of wrongdoing must hold when forgiving is 
maintaining respect for the moral law. You must adopt negative reactive attitudes towards “the 
moral injuries done to [you],” for to not adopt a negative reactive attitude to a moral injury is a “a 
failure to care about the very rules of morality” (Murphy and Hampton 1988 18). In order to forgive 
virtuously, you must maintain the rules of morality while forgiving. You cannot excuse, justify, or 
condone the action but must continue to hold it as a wrong that ought not to have been done. If 
you were to claim to forgive but really only saw the action as no longer being wrong or being that 
wrong, you have abandoned your moral framework and thus not truly forgiven. In the case of 
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Botham Jean and Amber Guyger, if Brandt Jean had not seen Amber’s act as fully wrong, instead 
judging that she had good reason to shoot in those circumstances, then he could no longer see the 
act as a wrongdoing and would be unable to forgive because there would be nothing to forgive. 
Brandt must hold that Amber ought not to have and was wrong in killing his brother in order to 
properly forgive Amber. Therefore, forgiveness “requires that a wrong not be disregarded, 
overlooked, or dismissed” but appreciated as what it is – a wrong (North 1987 502).  
Change of Attitude 
Jeffrie G. Murphy’s overcoming resentment account of forgiveness is one of the most 
prominent accounts discussed in the literature of forgiveness. His account forms the basis on which 
my account builds. Thus, before further discussing my account of forgiveness, I ought to lay out 
Murphy’s account. Murphy follows Joseph Butler’s model of forgiveness as the overcoming of 
resentment that one has incurred from a moral injury. Murphy begins by distinguishing forgiveness 
from three concepts that it is often confused with: excuse, justification, and mercy (Murphy and 
Hampton 1998 20).  
When one excuses a wrong, one says that because of circumstances or certain factors about 
the situation or state of the actor, such as the actor being insane, it would also be wrong or unfair 
to hold the wrongdoing against the actor. Excusing rids the actor of responsibility and blame for 
his actions. To justify a wrong is to say that the act was not actually wrong due to the various 
circumstances surrounding it, such as killing as an act of self-defense. Justification absolves the 
act of its wrongness and makes it morally permissible. Forgiveness may not be either of these 
actions, for forgiveness must hold that the action is wrong and deserving of resentment. When an 
actor is not responsible or the action is not wrong, there is nothing to resent as there was not a 
proper wrongdoing, making forgiveness not applicable.  
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Next, forgiveness is not mercy. As Murphy defines it, “to be merciful is to treat a person 
less harshly than…one has a right to treat that person” (Murphy and Hampton 1998 20). When 
having mercy on a person, one is benevolently bestowing a kind of gift unto the person. Further, 
mercy deals with one’s treatment of a transgressor, not one’s attitude towards a transgressor. Thus, 
forgiveness and mercy differ in how they are bestowed.  
Forgiveness, on Murphy’s account, is a change of attitude and is unrelated to any action or 
change of action (Murphy and Hampton 1998 21). A victim can properly forgive her wrongdoer 
while also continuing to rebuke or treat the wrongdoer harshly for his action so long as the victim 
has forgone her resentment, under Murphy’s account. However, not all instances of overcoming 
resentment count as forgiveness. For example, if a victim releases her resentment because she had 
amnesia and no longer remembers the wrong, the victim has merely forgotten and not forgiven. 
This is why forgiveness must be defined in terms of a moral reason that it was done for. 
Forgiveness must forswear resentment on moral grounds, which will be discussed further near the 
end of this chapter (Murphy and Hampton 1998 24). For the present purposes, it is important to 
know that Murphy’s account of forgiveness is defined as the overcoming of resentment, which 
distinguishes it from other actions, such as excuse, justification, mercy, and forgetting.  
In forgiving Amber Guyger publicly, Brandt Jean makes a remarkable statement: “I love 
you.” Brandt effectively rejects any negative reactive attitudes he felt towards Amber for her 
wrong in a compelling manner and replaces them with an attitude of love. In this section, I will 
follow Murphy’s account of forgiveness as an overcoming of resentment. However, I add that 
forgiveness overcomes all negative reactive attitudes resultant from the wrong, not just resentment. 
Further, I will argue that forgiveness must not only foreswear negative reactive attitudes but also 
replace them with positive attitudes, as Brandt did. Forgiveness involves an overcoming of all 
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negative reactive attitudes, including but not limited to resentment, anger, hatred, indignation, and 
disappointment while replacing them with positive attitudes.  
Forgoing Negative Reactive Attitudes  
While forgiveness continues the protest of negative reactive attitudes in that it too demands 
mutual respect, it continues the protest in another manner. Forgiveness continues to hold that the 
action was wrong and ought not to have happened, but it finds a better alternative to pursue than 
continuing to hold negative reactive attitudes. Negative reactive attitudes are painful, so victims 
of wrongdoing will often look for other alternatives to pursue when they see fit. Forgiveness is one 
of these alternatives, in which the victim must forgo or abandon her negative reactive attitudes in 
order to no longer hold the wrong against the wrongdoer in a negative way. 
A victim may not be able to desire to forgive one day and have forgiven, but rather must 
work on forgiving her wrongdoer over time. Forgiveness is a “willed change of heart – the 
successful result of an active endeavor,” in that the victim of the wrongdoing must consciously 
work on overcoming her negative reactive attitudes to no longer have an adversarial stance towards 
her wrongdoer (North 1987 506). This is no easy task, for relinquishing negative reactive attitudes 
can be a laborious undertaking. However, when forgiving one must commit to overcoming their 
negative reactive attitudes, dissolving their resentment, indignation, anger, hate, and/or 
disappointment in their wrongdoer while maintaining the previous conditions of respect previously 
discussed – respect for oneself, respect for wrongdoer, and respect for moral law.   
Most popular accounts of forgiveness, such as Murphy’s, speak of forgiveness as only 
overcoming resentment. I find this to be inadequate, as victims have a plethora of other negative 
reactive attitudes in the wake of wrongdoing, such as indignation, hate, and disappointment. It 
would be neglectful to overlook these negative reactive attitudes when speaking of forgiveness, as 
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they need to be forgone as well.  These other negative reactive attitudes that I defend are similar 
in nature to resentment, as they too are directed at the wrongdoer and communicate a protest to the 
wrongdoing and demand to reestablish mutual respect. When being wronged, a victim may only 
feel disappointed in her wrongdoer but not feel resentment. Under Murphy’s account, this victim 
would not have something to forgive for she would not have any resentment to forgo. However, I 
argue that the victim still has just as much ability to forgive as a resentful victim due to 
disappointment also being a wrongdoer-directed negative reactive attitude. Further, if a victim 
were to feel both resentful and indignant after a wrongdoing, she would have to rid herself of both 
negative reactive attitudes. If she were to just rid herself of resentment, she would still feel a moral 
anger towards the wrongdoer as an agent against moral laws. A victim cannot maintain this attitude 
while claiming to forgive, for she is very actively continuing to hold the wrong against the 
wrongdoer. Thus, any negative reactive attitude must be forgone when forgiving. 
Positive Element 
It is not enough for the forgiver to remove her negative reactive attitudes, she must also 
gain positive attitudes towards the wrongdoer. As Philpott argues, forgiveness involves a 
“constructive act” in “adopt[ing] a new and enduring view of [the wrongdoer] such that [the 
victim]…views him as a person in good standing” (Philpott 2013 402). This “active reconstrual of 
the perpetrator” adds a necessary positive element to forgiveness in “extend[ing] towards [the 
wrongdoer] an attitude of real goodwill” (Philpott 2013 402, Holmgren 1993 345). Victims of 
wrongdoing must “no longer desire [their wrongdoer’s] downfall…but instead want him to 
flourish” (Griswold 2007 155). This can be illustrated by Brandt’s statement to Amber “I love 
you… I personally want the best for you.” Brandt went far beyond forgoing his negative reactive 
attitudes and adopted a strongly positive sentiment towards her. While it is not required for victims 
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of wrongdoing to go as far as to say they love their wrongdoer, some adoption of positive 
sentiments and wishing well towards their wrongdoer is required.  
Change of Action  
Additionally, forgiving must also be an action. A change of attitude alone, like Murphy 
argues for, is not enough, the victim must do more when forgiving in order to fully exercise the 
positive element required.  Victims of wrongdoing must change their actions towards their 
wrongdoer in order to no longer be in active resistance and to stop practicing negative reactive 
attitudes. In order to completely forgive, you must change your actions towards your wrongdoer 
in two ways: 1) you must morally reconcile with your wrongdoer, and 2) reaccept the wrongdoer 
into the moral community. I also add that reconciling the person relationship that you had with 
your wrongdoer is an action that certain victims should undertake depending upon the 
circumstances of the situation. Not all victims must achieve full or partial relationship 
reconciliation, for it may be too damaging to do this, however, many situations would greatly 
benefit from relationship reconciliation  
Moral Reconciliation 
 Linda Radzik makes a distinction between two types of reconciliation, moral reconciliation 
and personal reconciliation. Radzik defines moral reconciliation as a reestablishment of moral 
trustworthiness which dissolves the titles of ‘victim’ and ‘wrongdoer’ (Radzik 2009 114). 
Radzik uses Karen Jones’ definition of trust as “an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and 
competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with 
the expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that we 
are counting on her” (Jones 1996 4). To morally reconcile with someone is to no longer view the 
wrongdoer as an agent against the moral laws, as an untrustworthy person, or as a wrongdoer. 
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Moral reconciliation releases the moral claims against the wrongdoer, and thus leaves “the roles 
of victim and wrongdoer behind” (Radzik 2009 115).  
Radzik further argues that moral reconciliation and forgiveness are distinct and may or may 
not go together. While she concedes that they can often go together, ultimately, she argues that it 
is not necessary, for one can forgive without morally reconciling or one could morally reconcile 
without forgiving. I agree that one can morally reconcile without forgiving due to how hard it can 
be to release negative reactive attitudes and due to moral reconciliation and forgiveness having 
“differing directionality” (Radzik 2009 118). The differing directionality that exists between the 
two is illustrated in that one can resent someone while still trusting them, for, as Radzik states, I 
can resent you for the situation you put me in while still trusting that you’ll keep me safe and see 
me through.    
However, I disagree with her that one can forgive without morally reconciling. Radzik 
makes this argument by stating that people can forgive for reasons such as mercy, pity, or wanting 
to inspire reformation. I see these reasons for forgiving as not being respect seeking, which 
forgiveness ought to aim for to be proper. Rather, these reasons disrespect the agency of the 
wrongdoer and view them as ‘less than.’ For example, when forgiving out of trying to inspire 
reformation, the victim views herself as higher than the wrongdoer. The victim sees herself as a 
morally superior teacher in which she can forgive her wrongdoer out of her own grace to inspire 
his moral education. This is not virtuous forgiveness, for the victim does not see her wrongdoer as 
a free moral agent but rather as something like a child to be taught and pitied.  
To forgive virtuously, the victim ought to morally reconcile with the wrongdoer as a way 
of no longer holding the wrong against the wrongdoer. When forgiving, the victim ought to come 
to see the wrongdoer as someone whom she may morally trust again in the future. The victim must 
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further release the bondage of the titles of ‘victim’ and ‘wrongdoer’ as she no longer views her 
wrongdoer as a morally rotten person but now as a person capable of good moral decisions. This 
will require the victim to humbly and compassionately view the wrongdoer, not in terms of his 
wrong, but as a whole, as a person who has wronged but who has also righted that wrong. The 
victim must accept that she too has likely wronged others in order to view her own wrongdoer with 
such compassion. The willed change of attitude required when forgiving will allow the victim to 
further willfully and morally reconcile with her wrongdoer. In order to no longer hold the wrong 
against the wrongdoer, which is required by forgiveness, the victim must morally reconcile with 
the wrongdoer to see him as a morally trustworthy person. 
Reacceptance 
When the wrongdoer is distrusted or resented, he is expelled from the moral community as 
an agent against moral laws as evident in his wrong. In order for the wrongdoer to be reaccepted 
into the moral community and no longer be on its fringes, he must be forgiven. When morally 
reconciling with a wrongdoer, the victim is now able to reaccept the wrongdoer into the moral 
community. Moral reconciliation leads to reacceptance in that it changes the victim’s view of the 
wrongdoer as no longer a morally corrupt person, but rather as a person, just like herself, who has 
made mistakes. Now the wrongdoer, who no longer holds this title, can be welcomed back into the 
moral community by the victim. From here, it is up to the community as to whether they too 
reaccept and reconcile with the wrongdoer. 
Relationship Reconciliation  
In addition to moral reconciliation, there is also relationship reconciliation which is what 
we commonly refer to when speaking of reconciliation. In relationship reconciliation, the victim 
and the wrongdoer move towards reestablishing the previous personal relationship, such as friends 
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or spouses, that they held before the wrong. When no longer holding your wrongdoer in an 
adversarial stance, i.e. relinquishing negative reactive attitudes, and adopting a positive stance, the 
victim naturally can move towards relationship reconciliation, though not necessarily fully.  
Relationship reconciliation is not a requirement of forgiveness but rather a possible added 
action depending on the wrong and the parties’ relationship. Relationship reconciliation cannot be 
fully required. To require relationship reconciliation as a condition of forgiveness would require a 
victim of rape to restore her relationship with her rapist. One can easily see how damaging, painful, 
and dangerous this would be to the victim’s wellbeing. Thus, relationship reconciliation can only 
be a possible action depending on the circumstances of the situation. This type of reconciliation 
will be at the discretion of the victim, as she may choose to what degree of a relationship will be 
restored. However, as previously mentioned, moral reconciliation – the restoration of general 
moral trust in the wrongdoer – is a required action that the victim must undertake if she is to count 
as forgiving.  
In the case of Brandt Jean and Amber Guyger, Brandt successfully changed his actions 
towards Amber, making his forgiveness complete. Brandt reconciled with Amber, as seen by their 
long embrace after his statement, and welcomed her into the moral community by his public 
expression of his forgiveness and love for her as a fellow human. With these steps, Brandt 
successfully and fully forgave Amber for her tremendous wrongdoing.  
Conditional Forgiveness 
Given that forgiveness is a virtue, it must be done for moral reasons. Proper forgiveness 
ought not to occur simply for therapeutic reasons, such as wanting to rid oneself of the negative 
consequences and feelings resultant of holding negative reactive attitudes, or reasons that damage 
self-respect, respect for the wrongdoer, or respect for the moral laws, it must be performed for the 
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right reasons. I argue that there are three conditions that must be present for forgiveness to be 
virtuous: 1) cessation of the wrongdoing, 2) repentance, and 3) separation of the wrong from the 
wrongdoer. When all three of these conditions occur, the victim is now able to virtuously forgive 
rather than merely condoning, pitying, or having mercy. 
Cessation 
Cessation of the wrongdoing ought to be an obvious precondition to forgiveness. Since 
forgiveness is respect seeking and must maintain the three conditions of respect – respect for 
oneself, respect for the wrongdoer, and respect for moral law – the wrongdoer must stop wronging 
the victim in order for forgiveness to be possible. Without cessation of the wrong, forgiving would 
merely be condoning the wrong, for the victim would be accepting that treatment as permissible, 
or disrespecting herself, her wrongdoer, or the moral laws in some other way. If a victim of abuse 
were to claim to forgive her abuser while he is beating her, we would not say she has forgiven him, 
for forgiveness would not yet be possible in this situation.  Rather, we would say that the victim is 
condoning the treatment, perhaps because she views herself as deserving of that treatment, etc. 
Thus, cessation of the wrongdoing is the first necessary condition for forgiveness to be possible.  
Repentance 
Repentance also must be required of the wrongdoer before forgiveness may occur, for 
without it the victim would also be merely condoning or disrespecting herself, the wrongdoer, 
and/or moral laws. Repentance is “the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one’s 
wrongful…actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one’s character that generate the actions, [and] 
the resolve to do one’s best to extirpate those aspects of one’s character” (Murphy 1982 147). 
More simply, repentance is the wrongdoer’s move to divorce himself from his wrongdoing, 
rebuking it, and changing his heart in attempt to right the wrong. Repentance recognizes the 
32 
dignity and worth of the victim because it is “acknowledg[ing] that the attitude displayed in [his] 
actions was such as might properly be resented” (Strawson 1962 191). The wrongdoer is able to 
actively join forces with the victim in protesting the wrong, for his resentment communicates an 
agreement that the action was wrong and ought to be protested.  In the wrongdoer divorcing 
himself from the wrongdoing through repentance, “forgiveness of him is possible without tacit 
approval of his evil act” or disrespecting one of the respect conditions – respect for oneself, respect 
for the wrongdoer, and respect for moral laws (Murphy and Hampton 1988 24-25). 
Some philosophers such as Aurel Kolnai argue that there exists a paradox of forgiveness 
in which repentance seems to make forgiveness incoherent (Murphy and Hampton 1998 41-42). 
They argue that “what seems required to make a change of heart towards a wrongdoer something 
other than condonation,” namely, repentance, “supplies the foundation for explaining and 
justifying that the change of heart as something other than forgiveness” (Murphy and Hampton 
1998 42). These opponents argue that after repentance the forgiver “would merely be treating [the 
wrongdoer] fairly, justly, and reasonably, in view of his change of heart” (Murphy and Hampton 
1998 41). This paradox seems to make forgiveness “internally incoherent” because one is either 
condoning, when there is the absence of repentance, or treating someone “in accordance with their 
virtue,” when there is repentance (Murphy and Hampton 1998 42). In other words, when the 
wrongdoer joins in protest of the wrong, there is nothing for forgiveness to do. Thus, repentance 
makes forgiveness impossible due to there no longer being something to forgive. 
 I find this assessment to be incorrect. Forgiveness still has something to do after 
repentance; it must accept the wrongdoer’s repentance and affirm his change of heart. As 
Hieronymi argues, in accepting repentance, “the [victim] in some way ratifies, or makes real, the 
[wrongdoer’s] change in heart” (Hieronymi 2001 550). Therefore, forgiveness is still needed after 
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repentance, for it makes the repentance real. By this, I mean that forgiveness ratifies the 
wrongdoer’s repentance and change of heart through the victim’s accepting it as valid and 
sufficient. Without this affirmation, the wrongdoer would continue to suffer the pain that repenting 
may cause, such as shame, guilt, and embarrassment; however, after being forgiven the wrongdoer 
may move on to make amends with the victim and the moral injuries inflicted. Further, this 
affirmation of the change of heart is what allows the victim to reaccept the wrongdoer into the 
moral community and move towards moral and relationship reconciliation with him. Without 
repentance, none of these essential actions could occur in a way consistent with respect.  
Separating Wrong from Wrongdoer 
After the wrongdoer has repented, the victim must come to separate the wrong from the 
wrongdoer in order to finally forgive. In following Saint Augustine, the victim of a wrongdoing 
must come to hate the sin not the sinner in order to forgive her wrongdoer while holding respect 
for herself, the wrongdoer, and moral law. When separating the wrong from the wrongdoer, the 
victim is now able to see her wrongdoer as a morally decent person rather than a morally rotten 
person (Murphy and Hampton 1998 85). The victim is able to see their wrongdoer as someone 
deserving forgiveness and love rather than as someone who is morally tainted. This will require a 
great deal of compassion towards one’s wrongdoer in order to no longer see them as an adversary.  
This allows the victim to forgive – to overcome her negative reactive attitudes, adopt a 
positive stance towards the wrongdoer, morally reconcile, and reaccept the wrongdoer into the 
moral community. It would be hard to imagine a victim forsaking her negative reactive attitudes, 
adopting a positive attitude, morally reconciling, and reaccepting the wrongdoer into the moral 
community if the victim still saw the wrongdoer as continuing to promote the message of the 
wrong.  
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Separating the wrong from the wrongdoer allows the victim and wrongdoer to join forces 
in forsaking the wrongful action. In repenting, the wrongdoer comes to see his action as indeed 
wrong and deserving of negative reactive attitudes and is essentially protesting the wrong 
alongside the victim, though his repentance has not yet been ratified. Through this divorcing, the 
victim can affirm the wrongdoer’s change of heart and ratify his repentance to join together to 
protest the wrong and its message of disrespect. The separation of the wrong from the wrongdoer 
is what allows the victim to ratify the wrongdoer’s repentance, allowing for forgiveness to occur 
and for the wrongdoer to further make amends and reparations for his wrong. 
Conclusion 
Forgiveness is an incredibly complex change of attitude and action. Forgiveness must be 
virtuous, for it is a respect seeking action in protest to moral injury and wrongdoing. When 
forgiving, three conditions of respect must be maintained in order for it to be virtuous – respect for 
oneself, respect for the wrongdoer as a moral agent, and respect for moral laws. These three 
conditions are essential to forgive successfully rather than condoning, excusing, justifying, or 
pitying. Forgiveness is also a change of attitude in that the victim must forgo her negative reactive 
attitudes and replace them with a positive stance towards the wrongdoer, such as love. This, 
however, is not enough. The victim must also change her actions towards the wrongdoer. She must 
morally reconcile and reaccept the wrongdoer into the moral community in order to restore mutual 
respect. This change of attitude and action are only made possible through moral reasons, since 
forgiveness is a virtue that must be done on moral grounds. The moral grounds of forgiving are 
cessation of wrongdoing, repentance, and separating the wrong from the wrongdoer. Finally, it is 
with this that the victim is now able to virtuously and properly forgive the wrongdoer. While this 
account of forgiveness is rather demanding, it ensures that the victim and the wrongdoer restore 
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mutual respect in a constructive manner. While this demanding account can make forgiveness 
unavailable to some victims, such as victims with unrepentant wrongdoers, the victim does not 
have to be a captive of the wrongdoing or wrongdoer, for victims have other options available to 
release their negative reactive attitudes and move on from the wrong, such as mercy.  
All of these conditions and requirements of forgiveness were illustrated in the case of 
Brandt Jean and Amber Guyger. During Amber’s testimony in court, she had repented for her 
wrongdoing through sincerely apologizing for her actions in the public sphere. This allowed 
Brandt Jean to will forgiveness. In doing so, Brandt publicly forgave her, proclaimed his love for 
her as a fellow human, and wished her the best, effectively reaccepting her into the moral 
community and moving towards reconciliation, as illustrated by their long embrace. It can be seen 
that Brandt properly forgave Amber for murdering his brother in his own apartment. While doing 
this, Brandt further made a controversial remark, “I don’t even want you to go to jail.” In the 
following chapter, I will define punishment, socially and criminally, in order to move on to the 
main task of this thesis – discovering the relationship between punishment and forgiveness. This 
will allow us to see if Brandt was required to wish her no punishment for her wrongdoing or if he 
went beyond the bounds of forgiveness in stating this.   
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CHAPTER III 
PUNISHMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will define punishment, both legally and socially, in order to answer my 
central question on the compatibility, or lack thereof, of forgiveness and punishment. I will not go 
into or discuss the various justifications of punishment, for this is not central to the task of my 
thesis. I will use the standard account of punishment, as presented by David Boonin, when defining 
punishment and will highlight what it is about wrongs that lead us to desire to punish them. 
 First, let us go back to the Brandt Jean and Amber Guyger case. We have established in 
the previous chapter that Brandt had properly forgiven Amber for murdering his brother, for he 
released his resentment, proclaimed his love for her as a fellow human, and wished her the best in 
her life, reaccepting her into the moral community and moving towards reconciliation with her, all 
done after she repented. When forgiving, Brandt had stated that he does not want Amber to go to 
jail or suffer in his forgiving of her. Surely Brandt could have chosen to rebuke Amber’s actions, 
calling her trigger-happy or even racist, urged for boycotting the police station, or even pleaded 
for a longer sentence. Rather, Brandt chose to forgive her and gave up on punishment. Was this 
required of Brandt? Must he have wished to forgo any punishment towards her in order to forgive 
her? This will all be answered in the next chapter, but for now we must define punishment.  
Standard Account of Punishment 
Boonin in The Problem of Punishment lays out a clear definition of punishment following 
the standard account set by Anthony Flew, S. I. Benn, and H. L. A. Hart. He defines punishment 
as an authorized, intentional, reprobative, retributive harming. Following Linda Radzik in The 
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Ethics of Social Punishment, I will replace ‘retributive’ with ‘reactive’ in order to avoid confusion 
as ‘retributive’ has other connotations relating to the justification of punishment. Thus, the 
definition of punishment that will be expounded upon in this chapter is an authorized, 
intentional, reprobative, reactive harming.  
Firstly, we will start off with the harm condition, as it is the most easily seen condition. 
Punishment clearly harms in terms of the pain, suffering, and hard treatment that people face as 
consequence of being punished. For example, going to prison clearly causing suffering as it is a 
loss of freedom. Further, when parents are choosing how to discipline their child for misbehaving, 
they will not choose something the child would enjoy. Rather, they choose some form of hard 
treatment, such as time-out, taking away toys, or spanking. If a parent were to punish and the child 
did not see it as a harm, it would be a failed attempt at punishment. Thus, harm is an essential 
characteristic of punishment. 
Secondly, punishment in also intentional. When punishing, the punisher is knowingly and 
intentionally inflicting harm. When sentencing someone to prison and thus removing their 
freedom, the punisher foreseeably imposes a prison sentence to harm the punished. One does not 
necessarily intend all of the foreseeable, harmful consequences of punishment, such as the 
probability of someone getting beaten in prison. The punisher intends the punishment to be the 
removal of freedom, not all of the adverse effects that actually being in prison may have. When 
someone is beaten in prison, their being beaten was not a part of their punishment; only the removal 
of freedom and placement in prison counts as the punishment because that is what was 
intentionally given. 
Thirdly, punishment is reactive because it is imposed in response to a perceived 
transgression. If one were to ‘punish,’ but for no reason or not in a reaction to a perceived 
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transgression, we would say that it is not punishment but abuse, tyranny, or the like. Punishment 
must be the reactive and intentional harming of a transgressor, such as imposing a fine on a driver 
for parking in a handicap spot without authorization. The intentional harm – the imposed fine – is 
in reaction to the driver breaking a rule. This reactive condition is what separates parents’ 
disciplining from abusive parents. Spanking your kid for misbehaving, while it may be 
controversial, is punishment, while spanking your kid for no reason is abuse. 
Fourthly, to count as punishment, the action must be reprobative. Punishment expresses to 
the transgressor, “you ought not to have done that.” This disapproving message reinforces the rules 
or laws in place and communicates to the society what is and is not acceptable. When we send 
someone to prison, part of what we are doing is expressing disapproval to the punished.  
Lastly, punishment is authorized. It is not a state of war in which anyone may harm anyone. 
To punish properly, you must have the authority to do so. This is why vigilantes are not permitted 
in our society, for they do not have the authority to punish people. This separates our system of 
punishment from Hobbes’ state of nature or Locke’s state of war; punishment is not merely any 
person taking whatever means to harm their transgressor. Certain punishments are monopolized 
by the state, such as taking away freedom and deciding life and death. No one else has the authority 
to punish by these means.  
There are punishments left over for people to use, for not all punishment is reserved only 
for the state. We may rebuke, shame, call-out, and embarrass our transgressors, among other 
things. These are examples of social punishment. This next section will define social punishment 
and show how social punishment also fits in with the standard account of punishment.  
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Social Punishment 
As Linda Radzik states in The Ethics of Social Punishment, social punishment is non-legal 
and non-divine punishment (Radzik 9). There are two classes of social punishment, formal and 
informal. Formal social punishment is a much more familiar practice for us, for it is punishment 
within a hierarchical structure. Conversely, informal social punishment is punishment between 
peers. While this form of punishment is used extremely often by us, we do not always immediately 
call it ‘punishment.’  
 First, we’ll discuss formal social punishment (FSP). FSP is an asymmetrical form of 
punishment, in that it is an authority punishing its subjects, or those that are under their justifiable 
power to punish (Radzik 9). By asymmetrical, I mean that the punisher is superior to or has 
authority over the punished in a way that justifies her punishing him. This form of punishment is 
very similar to legal punishment, for legal punishment is also asymmetrical. Prime examples of 
FSP include parent-child and employer-employee interactions. These examples of FSP are 
asymmetrical in that a parent is above their child and an employer is above her employee, making 
their relationship not one amongst peers, but a hierarchical one. When defining punishment in the 
previous section, I used examples of parental punishment to elaborate on the definition. FSP easily 
fits into the definition of punishment.  
To show how easily FSP fits into Boonin’s definition of punishment, I’ll show how a parent 
punishing his child is an authorized, intentional, reprobative, reactive harming, i.e. punishment. 
We will use the example of a parent putting his child into time-out for not sharing her toys.  The 
parent harms the child in that he takes away her freedom to continue playing by placing her in 
timeout. This is clearly done intentionally, as the parent knowingly enforces this harm. Next, it is 
reactive, for the parent put his child in timeout in response to her not sharing her toys. When doing 
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this, the parent is expressing disapproval of the child’s action, fulfilling the reprobative condition. 
Lastly, the parent is authorized to do so because he has the jurisdiction or justifiable ability to 
reasonably punish his own child. Thus, FSP fits into the definition of punishment easily.  
 Now I’ll show how informal social punishment (ISP), or the punishment between peers, 
also fits into the definition of punishment using the example of someone rebuking their friend for 
lying to them. A rebuke, as defined by Radzik, is “an overt expression of disapproval, through 
words or gestures, addressed to a perceived transgressor, that both attributes responsibility to her 
for a transgression and expresses some form of anger” (Radzik 13). The rebuke is a form of a harm, 
for it is a hard treatment in that it is unpleasant to be subjected to others’ anger. The friend is also 
intentionally inflicting this harm on her friend due to her overtly expressing her anger. Rebukes 
are also reactive because they express responsibility for transgressions, in this case the lying. It is 
further reprobative because it is an angry expression of disapproval, in rebuking the person is 
telling her friend, “you ought not to have done that to me.” Lastly, it can be authorized either 
through a top-down justification1, in that “authority to hold people accountable for moral 
wrongdoing is universal,” or through a bottom-up justification2, in which the authority to hold 
people accountable for moral wrongdoing is relationship dependent (Radzik 58). 
                                               
1 The top-down justification for punishment argues that everyone has the right to punish everyone as equal human 
beings. This right “can be limited for specific, defeasible reasons,” such as a habitual wrongdoer no longer being able 
to punish wrongdoing (Radzik 102). Philosophers such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes hold such views in their 
social contract political theories, where in the state of nature everyone holds the right to punish every wrongdoer. In 
these theories, the right to punish is only partially forfeited to the political community so that they may have a 
monopoly on certain hard treatments and violence in order to avoid a state of war or state of constant violence. 
However, this forfeiture is only of specific, typically more violent, means of punishment. Thus, most social 
punishment is not limited or forfeited. Steven Darwall has a Kantian account of the top-down justification, in which 
being a moral agent is being able to “legitimately make demands of other people[] and…hold people accountable for 
failing to satisfy those demands” (Radzik 106). We all have a moral obligation to enforce the rules of morality, as 
Darwall argues. This universal obligation is “subject to restraint for specific reasons,” such as maximizing positive 
consequences, maintaining privacy, and avoiding meddling in other’s relationships (Radzik 106).  In sum, the top-
down justification argues that there is a universal right to punish, which may be limited on state monopolized forms 
of punishment and the maintenance of certain goods.  
2 The bottom-up strategy argues that the authority to punish is held in particular relationships. As Radzik illustrates, 
if someone makes a promise to another, they enter into a special relationship which allows the other person to hold 
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It is my goal just to show how ISP fits into the definition of punishment, not fully argue 
for its existence and the authority behind it, so I will leave my argument here. However, it is easy 
to see how Brandt Jean could have punished Amber Guyger for killing his brother. Brandt could 
have pleaded for a long prison sentence, publicly rebuked Amber, or called for protests of the 
police station where Amber worked. Yet, Brandt chose to do none of the above and instead wished 
her no punishment, neither socially nor legally. Was Brandt required to do this since he forgave 
Amber? Or, did he go beyond his forgiveness when declining to punish? In this next chapter, we 
will inquire into the compatibility or incompatibility between forgiveness and punishment in order 
to answer this question. Until then, we must discover the relationship between wrongdoing and 
punishment in order to fully understand punishment.  
Wrongdoing and Punishment 
As I argued in chapter one, a wrong is a moral violation that communicates a diminishment 
or lack of respect for the victim’s guaranteed rights or worth, causing moral injury. Wrongdoings 
lead to negative reactive attitudes, such as resentment, anger, and hate. Wrongdoings lead to 
negative reactive attitudes due to the communication of disrespect, for the negative reactive 
attitudes are a kind of defense or protest against the insulting message the wrong sends. One has 
good reason to have negative reactive attitudes as a response to wrongdoing, for it affirms one’s 
worth and protests the message of the wrong. Negative reactive attitudes express a demand for 
mutual respect and hold the wrongdoer responsible for her actions.  
                                               
her accountable if she fails to keep her promise (Radzik 100). Friendship, partnerships, and other similar relationships 
also “enter into a kind of social contract with one another” giving them the right to hold each other accountable for 
their wrongdoings due to the special duties these relationships entail (Radzik 100). This justification for the authority 
to punish lies solely in special relationships, though some argue that in extreme situations, such as cases of human 
rights violations, being a fellow human being can be enough of a special relationship to grant interference to protect 
the other human (Radzik 102).  
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For example, if my boyfriend were to cheat on me, he would be communicating a 
disrespectful message to me that diminishes my worth, causing moral injury. In response to this, I 
will likely be angry and resentful, among other possible emotions, in order to demand mutual 
respect and protest his wrongful action. I would be expressing a claim that what was done to me 
was wrong and disrespectful through my negative reactive attitudes in protest of the wrong.  
We have already discussed one way of dealing with these negative reactive attitudes – 
forgiveness. However, there exists another response which we often opt for – punishment. 
Punishment is arguably our most common response to wrongdoing. What is it about wrongdoing 
that lead us to feel that punishment is a justifiable response? Since wrongdoing communicates a 
message of disrespect, we need to find a way to disprove or combat that claim in order for us to 
maintain our self-respect and validate our worth to ourselves and our community. Punishment can 
do just this. 
The Message of Punishment 
When wronging, the wrongdoer not only communicates the message that the victim is 
lower, but also seeks to create a world in which the victim is actually lower. Punishment aims to 
“remake the world in a way that denies what the [wrong has] attempted to establish” (Hampton 
1686-1687). Punishment is by definition reprobative, or expressive of disapproval. Thus, 
punishment too communicates a message to deny the wrong. In this section, I will argue that 
punishment defeats the message and reestablishes equality through lowering the wrongdoer’s 
value rather than raising the victim’s value.  
Jean Hampton in “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs” argues for an account of 
punishment that “vindicate[s] the value of the victim” that has been diminished by the wrongdoing 
through “the construction of an event that… repudiates the action’s message of superiority over 
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the victim…in a way that confirms them as equal” (Hampton 1686). Punishment “lower[s] the 
wrongdoer, elevat[es] the victim, and annul[s] the act of diminishment” that the wrongdoer creates 
as a result of his wrongful action. Punishment sends a message opposite to that of the wrongdoing 
through the infliction of hard treatment which both lowers the wrongdoer and elevates the victim, 
restoring equality.  
While Hampton does mention that the wrongdoer is lowered in punishment, she primarily 
focuses on and argues for the validation and restoration of the victim’s worth. Hampton’s account 
of punishment is very victim-centered, for she argues that punishment is primarily tasked with re-
establishing the victim’s worth that has been diminished by the wrongdoer via seeking to repair 
the damage done in the recognition of the victim’s value. Punishment is “inflicted to nullify” the 
wrong’s message, “placing the victim in the position she would have been in had the wrongdoer 
not acted” (Hampton 1698). This account of punishment aims at restoring the victim’s worth 
through returning the victim to her previous status. Through punishment, the punisher is affirming 
the victim’s worth, while defeating the wrongdoers claim through subjugating the wrongdoer to 
harsh treatment. Thus, according to Hampton’s view, punishment seeks to raise the victim from 
her diminished status thereby restoring equality to the parties through inflicting harsh treatment. 
Hampton acknowledges that criminal law infrequently validates the victim’s worth in such a way, 
for it is hard to determine the correct punishment to enforce. Yet, she maintains that punishment 
can and does sometimes accomplish this. 
I disagree with Hampton that punishment is an appropriate means of raising the victim’s 
sense of worth. Legal punishment, as enacted today, has little to do with the victim and everything 
to do with the wrongdoer. When punishing someone criminally, it is the political entity versus the 
wrongdoer rather than the victim versus the wrongdoer. Often, legal courts completely disregard 
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victim’s needs and requests. For example, leading up to and during rape trials the victim is often 
forced multiple times to relive her trauma, have blame placed upon her, and often have poor 
outcomes that do not aim to protect the victim. This shows how our legal system seeks only to 
prove that the wrongdoer is not superior and not permitted to wrong, rather than expressing that 
the victim has a higher value than she has been treated.  
Social punishment also does not raise the victim’s worth but lowers the wrongdoer’s worth. 
When socially punishing, the victim is seeking to have the wrongdoer feel the same level of 
diminishment as she did. The victim pulls down the wrongdoer from his position of superiority 
through harsh treatment and suffering, yet she does not raise herself up in this process. She would 
have to do some other action in order to raise her worth to where it was prior to the wrong. While 
punishing establishes equality, it does so in a negative way through bringing the wrongdoer down 
to the level of diminishment as the victim.   
In punishing someone, we are saying that the wrongdoer was in fact not superior to the 
victim and not permitted to treat the victim in a way that elevated the wrongdoer in respect to the 
victim. Unlike forgiveness, which seeks to restore respect through raising the victim, punishment 
seeks to lower the wrongdoer. We communicate to the wrongdoer that they are not superior to the 
victim through forcing hard treatment and suffering upon them. Thus, this diminishes the 
wrongdoer’s value to restore equality rather than raising the victim. Punishment expresses a 
degrading message that restores equality negatively – through lowering the wrongdoer – rather 
than positively- through raising the victim. Punishment is a denial of superiority in that it is solely 
wrongdoer-focused, rather than the denial of the victim’s inferiority. So, while punishment 
removes the superiority-inferiority relationship, it does not restore the victim but lowers the 
wrongdoer. Punishment accomplishes negative equality, that is, it restores equality through 
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making both parties diminished in value. Punishment degrades the wrongdoer since it is, by 
definition, an intentional, reprobative infliction of harm to the wrongdoer for his wrong. The 
infliction of harm on someone cannot raise the worth of another, but rather diminishes the worth 
of the punished.  
This can be seen in our society’s outlook and treatment of felons. When a felon returns to 
society, we often see, and some even treat him, as being of lower value due his committing a crime. 
We even directly discriminate against felons in employment, housing, public benefits, and voting. 
Thus, we see punishment as having diminished the wrongdoer to be inferior. Felons are treated as 
though they are of lower value compared to the non-felon. After criminal proceedings, our view 
of the wrongdoer is the only one that changes, not the victim. Punishment is focused only on the 
wrongdoer and upholding laws, it does not immediately care for the victim. Punishments are often 
given in a way that neither helps nor protects the victim, leaving the victim alone in the wake of 
wrongdoing while being concerned with the wrongdoer.  
Following my previous example, I can tell our family and friends of my boyfriend’s 
wrongful actions as a way of socially punishing him. With our family and friends knowing of his 
action, he will likely feel shame and may even be rebuked by others. In my socially punishing my 
boyfriend, I am expressing to him and the community that what he has done to me is wrong and 
should be disapproved. Further, I stand in defiance of his disrespectful message and demand 
mutual respect through forcing the wrongdoer to see himself as low as his wrong made me.  
The Vindication of Punishment 
Due to the message punishment sends, victims might feel a sense of vindication in their 
punishing even though punishment did not restore their value. Victims may feel vindicated in 
punishing due to their knowing that the message of their punishment refutes the message of the 
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wrongful action. Punishment, one might argue, is a way for the victim to be reassured that her 
worth is intact and respected as compared to the wrongdoer’s worth since they are now both equals, 
which can be very comforting to victims in the wake of wrongdoing. However, I argue that while 
the victim is reassured of her worth and equality, it is not done in a way that raises the victim’s 
worth to where it previously was. Rather, it lowers the wrongdoer’s worth so that their equality is 
restored and the victim is now an equal to the wrongdoer.  
The victim can even feel that justice will be served by punishment, for she feels like 
fairness is restored for her wrongdoer has too suffered. This is evident in our calling system of 
legal punishment the criminal justice system rather than just the criminal system. As a society, we 
find punishment to be justice; we believe that making a wrongdoer suffer has value. The 
wrongdoer’s suffering signifies that they are receiving their deserts and that fairness and justice 
has been restored. This is a prime reason why we often feel a need to punish others, for we feel 
that balance has been reestablished. Punishment restores this balance through the message it 
conveys and perhaps even through the possible value in the wrongdoer’s suffering.  
When I make it public that my boyfriend was unfaithful, I can feel comfort in subjecting 
him to harsh treatment and pulling him down to the same level as me, either by feeling that I have 
combated his disrespectful message or received justice. By punishing, I express reprobation for 
his actions, furthering my protest of the wrongdoing’s message. I may feel vindication in making 
him suffer through the message of punishment by thinking that fairness and justice has been 
restored. Thus, it is easy to see why victims so often opt for punishing their wrongdoers. However, 
the equality that I have restored is not a dignified one. My wrongdoer is dragged down by my 
actions and proven to not be superior to me. In doing this, I do not raise my worth but merely lower 
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my wrongdoer’s. This equality restored is a negative equality, in which we are both now lower 
than we started. 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I defined punishment as an authorized, intentional, reprobative, reactive 
harming, and showed how formal and informal social punishments fit into this. In doing so, I 
showed the various options available to Brandt Jean in punishing Amber Guyger that he chose to 
forgo. Further, I revealed why he might have valued exercising those options. Punishment 
continues the protest of negative reactive attitudes against wrongdoing, which itself had 
communicated a message of disrespect. Punishment restores equality between the victim and the 
wrongdoer through lowering the wrongdoer to the level of the victim, as opposed to forgiveness 
which reestablishes equality through raising the victim to her proper level of value. Punishment is 
often desired by victims, for it is a way for them to feel that fairness or justice is restored. Both 
forgiveness and punishment are seen to communicate messages to restore the balance of respect 
in the wake of wrongdoing in different ways, which is vital to the incompatibility between the two 
that will be argued in the next chapter. In the following chapter, I will analyze this further to 
determine the incompatibility of forgiveness and punishment.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FORGIVENESS AND PUNSIHMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 Now that we have established what forgiveness and punishment do, we may answer my 
central question – whether one may punish or endorse punishment after having forgiven. Before I 
move further into this chapter, I will provide a brief summary of the key aspects we have covered. 
First, I will discuss wrongdoing briefly to show what warrants forgiveness and punishment as 
options for victims. Then, I will review the definitions of forgiveness and punishment again in 
order to later argue for their incompatibility.  
Wrongdoing communicates a lack of respect and diminishment to the victim’s value, 
causing moral injury and negative reactive attitudes. Wrongdoing falsely lowers the victim’s value 
in relation to the wrongdoer, making the wrongdoer seem superior to the victim. In the wake of 
wrongdoing, we must find a way to restore equality and balance to the parties’ value. In this thesis, 
I have focused on two ways in which respect is restored – forgiveness and punishment.  
Forgiveness is respect-seeking, meaning the victim must maintain self-respect, respect for 
the wrongdoer, and respect for the moral laws while trying to restore her own respect. In order for 
this respect to hold, forgiveness must be conditional. Only after cessation of the wrong, repentance, 
and separating the wrong from the wrongdoer can the victim begin on the path of forgiveness and 
maintain these respect conditions. In repenting, the wrongdoer stands beside the victim in 
condemning the wrong, separating himself from the wrong and protesting the message of 
disrespect with the victim. This is how the victim is able to separate the wrong from the wrongdoer 
to move towards forgiveness. Forgiveness involves a change of attitude – the forgoing of negative 
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reactive attitudes and the adoption of positive attitudes- and a change of action- moral 
reconciliation, re-welcoming the wrongdoer into the moral community, and possible relationship 
reconciliation. Through forgiveness’ counter-message of respect and equality, the victim’s worth 
is lifted and restored, making her and her wrongdoer moral equals again. Thus, forgiveness 
positively restores respect through raising the victim up.  
Conversely, punishment restores respect through lowering the wrongdoer. Punishment is 
the authorized, intentional, reprobative, reactive harming of the wrongdoer, which applies to both 
legal and social punishment. Punishment expresses a counter-message much like forgiveness, 
however it communicates the inverse. Rather than trying to raise the victim’s worth, punishment 
lower’s the wrongdoer’s sense of superiority. Because punishment is an infliction of hard treatment 
or suffering, it diminishes the wrongdoer by subjugating him to a painful experience much like the 
victim endured. Punishment does not focus on the victim nor raising the victim’s worth, but just 
on lowering the wrongdoer.  
In this section, I will prove that after forgiveness, punishment is incompatible and no longer 
an option to a sincere forgiver. To do so, I will first show how punishing after forgiveness creates 
the reverse effect of the wrongdoing by elevating the victim above the wrongdoer. Since 
forgiveness’ aim is to restore respect and equal worth, punishment cannot be endorsed nor enacted 
by the forgiving victim. Next, I will show how the constructive acts that forgiveness is involved 
in are contradictory and incompatible with enacting or endorsing punishment after forgiveness. 
Punishment will negate and counteract the positive actions that forgiveness constructs, meaning 
sincere forgivers must forgo punishment after forgiving. Further, I will show that punishment 
continues to hold the wrong against the wrongdoer and places the victim in active resistance 
against the wrongdoer no matter whether the wrongdoer consents to his punishment or not, making 
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it incompatible with my definition of forgiveness. Lastly, I will argue that forgiveness restores 
justice, making punishment for the sake of justice gratuitous. Punishment accomplishes nothing 
constructive after forgiveness, for the wrongful the message has been defeated, the wrongdoer has 
had his title dissolved, and moral reconciliation has occurred. Thus, punishment cannot be 
endorsed nor enacted by the victim after she has forgiven.  
Preliminary Remarks 
It is important to note that I am not arguing that no one may punish a forgiven wrongdoer, 
just the victim may not punish or endorse the wrongdoer’s punishment. For example, the state still 
has a right to punish the wrongdoer if he acted in violation of the laws. The state has many reasons 
to punish beyond reasons the victim would have, such as maintenance of laws and equal sentencing 
among similar crimes. However, the victim, not being responsible for maintenance of laws and 
equal sentencing, may not endorse or enact punishment for the reasons I will argue in this section. 
The victim and the state have far different roles in the wake of wrongdoing, and as such they can 
permissibly have far different reactions to wrongdoing.  
Further, I am not arguing that a victim cannot seek reparations or compensation after 
forgiving her wrongdoer, unless the victim is doing so vengefully or in order to punish the 
wrongdoer. Victims have a right to have payment for their losses and may ask for them from the 
wrongdoer. For example, while I may forgive someone for keying my car, I can still ask them to 
pay for the damages they caused. This does not count as me punishing them but simply as seeking 
fair payment for the damages incurred. Thus, tort law, which focuses on the repayment of damages, 
is compatible with forgiveness. As Hampton argues in “Correcting Harms Versus Righting 
Wrongs,” “harms are the concern of tort law” (Hampton 1992 1661).  Tort law focuses on the 
wrongdoers “duty to repair the wrongful losses their conduct causes” but does not aim to punish 
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the wrongdoer for the wrongful action themselves (Hampton 1992 1661). Tort law “is not a branch 
of justice that is concerned with the wrongdoing itself;” that is saved for criminal law (Hampton 
1992 1663). It is perfectly acceptable for a victim to pursue tort law or reparations from her 
wrongdoer to correct the harm incurred as long as the victim does not do so vengefully.  
 Reparations can serve as evidence towards the wrongdoer’s repentance for his actions 
(Radzik 2004 149). They can provide more reason to believe the wrongdoer’s repentance is 
sincere, more easily allowing the wrongdoer to view him as morally trustworthy and deserving of 
forgiveness. A wrongdoer should be eager to pay just reparations to the victim as a way of showing 
his repentance and acknowledgement of the harm he caused through his wrongdoing. Thus, a 
victim should not have to seek tort law to receive just reparations if her wrongdoer is truly 
repentant for his wrongdoing.  
Lastly, punishment is compatible when done before forgiveness has been enacted. As 
Linda Radzik in “Making Amends” argues, self-imposed punishment can be further evidence that 
that “wrongdoer takes his error seriously and is trying to recommit himself to a moral life” (Radzik 
2004 149). Penance can serve as a “form of evidence of the wrongdoer’s re-commitment to 
morality” in his repentance (Radzik 2004 149). A victim may need this sort of evidence of the 
wrongdoer’s repentance in order to forgive him. Punishing her wrongdoer prior to forgiving poses 
no contradictions, for the victim has not yet committed to changing her attitude or actions towards 
the wrongdoer. Wrongdoers should be understanding and compliant to proportional, non-vicious 
forms of punishment as a way to prove their change of heart is sincere and long-lasting. Punishing 
prior to forgiveness does not preclude the victim from being able to forgive afterward. Certain 
wrongs are so bad that punishment may be the only way the victim can ensure the wrongdoer is 
repentant of his wrongdoing and no longer stands by the message of his wrongdoing.  
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However, I take issue when victims punish or endorse punishment after having forgiven 
her wrongdoer. As I will argue in this chapter, punishment communicates the opposite message of 
wrongdoing which is incompatible with forgiveness and leads to a new inequality of respect 
between the parties. Further, the conditions of forgiveness involving a change of action on behalf 
of the victim also makes forgiveness and punishment incompatible.  
Opposite Messages 
As argued previously, forgiveness and punishment both restore the mutual respect that was 
damaged by the wrongdoing. Forgiveness and punishment both continue the protest against the 
wrongdoing to demand mutual respect and repudiate the disrespectful message of the wrongdoing. 
However, they restore respect in a way that makes them incompatible with each other such that 
endorsing or enacting punishment after forgiveness creates a new inequality of respect.  
Forgiveness maintains the self-respect of the victim, the respect of the wrongdoer as a 
moral agent, and the respect of the moral law while restoring the mutual respect between the victim 
and the wrongdoer. If forgiveness is to be permissible, the wrongdoer must first stop and repent 
for his wrongdoing, putting himself in active defiance of the message of his wrongful action. 
Essentially, the wrongdoer joins the victim in protesting the wrongdoing and the disrespectful 
message it sent. The wrongdoer is making a counter claim in repenting that the wrong is indeed 
wrong and the victim has a permanent and infinite worth as a fellow human being that makes her 
above that treatment. The wrongdoing, which has degraded the victim in treating her as lesser, is 
rebuked by both the victim and the wrongdoer. This positively restores mutual respect between 
the wrongdoer and the victim by raising the victim to her previous, equal status.  
Further, forgiveness does not damage or lower the wrongdoer in any respects. Forgiveness 
is respect-seeking, both for the victim and the wrongdoer. Forgiveness is concerned with mutual 
53 
respect being restored to reestablish the moral standing of both parties. Moral reconciliation, re-
welcoming the wrongdoer into the moral community, and adopting a positive attitude towards the 
wrongdoer are all ways in which forgiveness actively restores the status of the wrongdoer and 
essentially dissolves the title of ‘wrongdoer.’ All of these steps reinforce the worth and respect 
given to the wrongdoer as a fellow human being. Proper forgiveness in no way could diminish the 
worth of the wrongdoer, for all of the changes of attitude and actions towards the wrongdoer are 
done so to maintain and uphold the Kantian worth and respect of the wrongdoer.  
Conversely, punishment does just the opposite. Punishment aims to lower the wrongdoer 
to the level of the victim after wrongdoing to restore mutual respect. Punishment is the infliction 
of harm and suffering, which communicates that the wrongdoer is deserving of this hard treatment 
due to his wrongdoing. This lowers the value of the wrongdoer while not caring to raise the value 
of the victim. Punishment is solely concerned with the wrongdoer and cares not about the victim, 
as argued previously. In punishing, one is forcing hard treatment onto the wrongdoer, which does 
nothing other than lower the worth of the wrongdoer to restore mutual respect between the 
wrongdoer and the victim.  
Thus, forgiveness and punishment achieve the opposite of each other. While forgiveness 
positively restores respect, punishment negatively restores respect. Since forgiveness is chiefly 
concerned with restoring worth and respect in a positive manner, the victim punishing or endorsing 
punishment after having forgiven is incompatible since it would lower the wrongdoer’s worth in 
relation to her own. The victim must forswear punishment after forgiving her wrongdoer in order 
to preserve the positive restoration of respect that forgiveness created. Further, if one were to 
punish after forgiving, a new inequality would be created. Since forgiveness raises the victim and 
punishment lowers the wrongdoer, when one punishes after forgiveness, the victim would now be 
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superior to the wrongdoer. Forgiveness seeks equal worth to be reinstated, not a superior victim. 
Thus, it is as if a new wrongdoing has occurred, now making the wrongdoer into a victim. The 
victim must forgo any punishment after having forgiven her wrongdoer in order to maintain the 
equality that forgiveness restored.   
Change of Action 
 My account of forgiveness involves multiple changes of actions that the victim must enact 
to fully forgive her wrongdoer. Firstly, victims must morally reconcile, or reestablish moral 
trustworthiness, with her wrongdoer to dissolve the titles of ‘wrongdoer’ and ‘victim’ to enable 
the parties to restore mutual respect and no longer allow the wrongdoing to shape their lives. Moral 
reconciliation further leads the victim to reaccept the wrongdoer into the moral community as an 
equal who is no longer morally rotten. Lastly, depending upon the wrongdoing that occurred and 
the nature of the relationship prior to the wrongdoing, the victim may need to move towards 
relationship reconciliation to fully forgive her wrongdoer. While the victim does not need to fully 
move towards full relationship reconciliation or move towards relationship reconciliation at all, it 
can be an added positive action that the victim can enact at her discretion. Ultimately, the victim 
must morally reconcile and welcome the victim into the moral community to fully and property 
forgive her wrongdoer. Also, before forgiveness may occur, victims must separate the wrong from 
the wrongdoer after the wrongdoer repents to affirm the wrongdoer’s change of heart and continue 
on the path towards forgiveness. 
 If a victim is actively punishing or endorsing the punishment of her wrongdoer, she will 
not be able to separate the wrong from the wrongdoer. Punishment is a way for the victim to hold 
the wrong against the wrongdoer and make him suffer because of it. Thus, it is apparent why this 
is not compatible with the separation of the wrong from the wrongdoer, for it accomplishes the 
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opposite. A victim may not be able to continue on the path of forgiveness until she has released 
her endorsement or enactment of punishment.  
 Next, punishment is not consistent with the changes of actions that forgiveness requires. A 
victim cannot claim to have morally reconciled with and welcomed the wrongdoer into the 
community while also punishing or endorsing the punishment of the wrongdoer. When the victim 
committed to forgiveness, she committed to adopting the constructive actions to restore equality 
and respect between herself and her wrongdoer, which punishment would invalidate and destroy. 
 Moral reconciliation commits one to no longer viewing her wrongdoer as an agent against 
moral laws, an untrustworthy actor, or as holding the title ‘wrongdoer.’ If one were to claim to 
morally reconcile yet endorse or enact punishment, criminally or socially, one has not actually 
morally reconciled. Punishment, when enacted or endorsed by the victim, continues to hold that 
the wrongdoer deserves hard treatment and suffering due to his action. Punishment is a way for 
the victim to continue to hold the wrongdoing against the wrongdoer, making it impossible to 
dissolve the title of ‘wrongdoer’ at the same time. One cannot claim to have accepted the 
wrongdoer’s change of heart and no longer view the wrongdoer as morally corrupt while also 
punishing the wrongdoer for his action after forgiveness and repentance has occurred. Punishment 
is a harsh way to continue to hold the wrongdoing against the wrongdoer. If one were to view her 
wrongdoer as morally trustworthy, why would one punish the wrongdoer? What goal would she 
be accomplishing besides a vicious one? The establishment of moral trustworthiness and 
punishment is not compatible, making forgiveness and punishment incompatible.  
 Further, a victim cannot reaccept her wrongdoer into the moral community while punishing 
or endorsing his punishment, for punishment forces the wrongdoer into margins of the moral 
community as morally corrupt and rotten. Punishment expresses reprobation through intentional 
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harming and typically makes it public to the community. A community would have a hard time 
reaccepting a wrongdoer while viewing the victim punish or endorse his punishment at the same 
time. The degrading message sent by punishment, namely, that the wrongdoer is morally lower 
than how he acted, does not lift up the wrongdoer and restore his standing but forces him beneath 
the community. How can one claim to accept the wrongdoer as a moral equal in the moral 
community while acting in a way that expresses that he is inferior? Punishment cannot occur while 
trying to reaccept the wrongdoer into the moral community; they cannot be compatible and thus 
forgiveness and punishment are not compatible.  
Active Resistance 
 One objection that has been raised to show how punishment and forgiveness can be 
compatible is Luke Russell’s account of forgiveness. Russell in “Forgiving While Punishing” 
argues for the non-adversarial account of forgiveness, in which a victim can punish so long as she 
is not taking an adversarial stance against the wrongdoer. Russell argues that while forgiveness 
removes resentment and other negative reactive attitudes, this is not sufficient. The victim must 
also take a non-adversarial stance toward the wrongdoer. By this, he means that the victim cannot 
“treat the [wrongdoer] in a way that the [wrongdoer] would be disposed to challenge” after being 
forgiven (Russell 2016 711). Thus, as long as the victim and wrongdoer have no point of contention 
or hostility towards each other, forgiveness has been achieved.  
Russell’s non-adversarial account allows for punishment and forgiveness to be compatible 
in cases where the wrongdoer accepts his punishment. As long as the wrongdoer does not take “the 
enforcement of punishment to be a point of contention between himself and the [victim],” the 
forgiveness remains (Russell 2016 712). Russell argues that when the victim forgoes her negative 
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reactive attitudes and the wrongdoer accepts punishment, there is no adversarial stance between 
the parties and they may “put the wrongdoing behind them, and move on” (Russell 2016 713).  
While Russell does hold that “the kind of gross interference constituted by enforcing 
punishment” on the wrongdoer is incompatible with forgiveness, consensual punishment is not. I 
find this to be incorrect, however. How could someone who is punishing another for their wrong 
turn around and say, “Don’t worry, I am not holding his wrong against him anymore” or “It’s ok, 
we’re putting the wrong behind us”? Any kind of punishment, consented to or otherwise, is still a 
way in which the victim is holding the wrongdoing against the wrongdoer and preventing them 
from moving on. The victim, though she is not an adversary towards the wrongdoer, continues to 
hold the wrongdoing against the wrongdoer and does so in a painful way. Continuing to punish 
the wrongdoer is continuing to let the wrongdoing shape their lives. This is not compatible with 
forgiveness as forgiveness includes the victim wishing the best for the wrongdoer and moving on 
from the wrongdoing. As argued previously, punishment makes it contradictory, if not impossible, 
for the victim to morally reconcile with and welcome the wrongdoer into the moral community. 
Punishment will always be a way of holding the wrongdoing against the wrongdoer, whether the 
punisher is an adversary or not. Further, forgiveness is a form of healing, for the victim’s worth 
has been restored and the wrongdoer’s moral standing has been restored through his repentance. 
Punishing after forgiving will only damage this and prove that the forgiveness was not proper or 
real. The victim must forgo punishment after forgiving in order to no longer allow the wrongdoing 
to have weight and influence in her and her wrongdoer’s life.   
Lastly, in such a relationship where a victim continues to punish her repentant, forgiven 
wrongdoer who accepts the punishment, a sort of sadomasochistic relationship has been created. 
The victim takes some sort of pleasure or vindication in her punishing the wrongdoer, who also 
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takes some pleasure out of being punished possibly through his feeling of remorse, shame, and 
desert. The wrongdoer’s value is still being lowered in this punishment, nor is it merely a 
consensual devaluation. This sadomasochistic relationship is not respectful and not compatible 
with forgiveness. The forgiving victim should no longer want the wrongdoer to experience hard 
treatment, for she has acknowledged the wrongdoers change of heart, dissolved his title as 
‘wrongdoer,’ and sees him as now being in good moral standing who deserves to flourish.  
Public Censure  
In Daniel Philpott’s “The Justice of Forgiveness,” Philpott argues that while forgiveness 
restores justice, “forgiveness could be compatible with punishment” to further defeat the 
wrongdoer’s injustice visible to the community (Philpott 2013 411). Philpott states that “when a 
victim wills punishment, she asserts that…punishment is also required to defeat the perpetrator’s 
injustice” (Philpott 2013 413). Philpott argues that there still may need to be a “communication of 
censure” to the public which punishment would accomplish. The injustice that the wrongdoing 
created in representing the victim as inferior stands victorious in the community’s eyes with just 
forgiveness, as Philpott argues. Punishment can be needed to defeat the last standing injustice. As 
Philpott argues, this endorsement or enactment of punishment does not express resentment against 
the wrongdoer but “voices [the victim’s] desire to see the standing victory of the injustice defeated” 
(Philpott 2013 414).  
 I argue that forgiveness can be public, making it defeat the injustice to the community and 
making punishment unnecessary. If the victim feels the wrongful message needs to be directly 
defeated publicly, she can ask the wrongdoer for a public apology, public repentance, and the like. 
This way the victim is confident that the message has been defeated in the eye of the community 
to ensure her worth is respected and acknowledged by all. This can be illustrated by an example 
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of a male coworker making a sexist joke about a female coworker to the office. Obviously, this 
wrongdoing is very public, making the wrongful message apparent to the victim’s coworkers. This 
can affect how the coworkers view the victim, as they may see the wrongful message as evidence 
that her worth is lower and she is deserving of less respect. If the wrongdoer were to come to 
realize his actions were wrong, repent, and ask for forgiveness, the victim may feel the need for a 
public apology in order to remove the message of the wrongdoing. This public apology would 
allow the wrongdoer to express his remorse and rescind the message that his wrongdoing conveyed 
in order to restore the victim’s worth in the eyes of the coworker. Thus, forgiveness can be made 
public at the request of the victim, making it unnecessary to further punish the wrongdoer. 
Punishment after a public repentance and forgiveness would be gratuitous for it would be 
unwarranted. 
Justice of Forgiveness 
In forgiving, the victim forgoes punishing. Does this mean that the victim has to give up 
on justice as well? In “The Justice of Forgiveness,” Daniel Philpott replies to critiques of political 
forgiveness as being unjust, specifically in the case of post-Apartheid South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation hearings. Philpott defines forgiveness as the relinquishing of resentment and a 
“positive act of construction” in which the victim “adopts a new and enduring view of [the 
wrongdoer” as a person in good moral standing (Philpott 2013 402). This positive reconstruction 
of the wrongdoer restores a right relationship between the parties and leads to, at least, partial 
reconciliation as moral equals.  
Philpott claims that forgiveness can “participate in or instantiate justice” when justice is 
conceived of as “righteousness or right relationship, understood comprehensively as the entire set 
of obligations of everyone in the community in relationship to one another” (Philpott 2013 401, 
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403). This conception of justice has two valences: it is either “a state of affairs” in which all are 
living in right relationship or “a process of restoring right relationship after an act of injustice” or 
wrongdoing, i.e. reconciliation (Philpott 2013 403). When justice is defined in terms of right 
relationship, “reconciliation is a concept of justice” as reconciliation is a restoration of a proper 
relationship (Philpott 2013 404). Thus, forgiveness restores justice insofar as it leads to a form of 
reconciliation, such as the moral reconciliation required by my account of forgiveness or the partial 
reconciliation given by restoring the wrongdoer’s moral standing.  
Justice has commonly been conceived of as giving someone their due. This might seem 
like a conflicting notion of justice. But, Philpott argues, the justice of reconciliation 
“encompasses…desert,” making it fit into the common conception of justice (Philpott 2013 405). 
Since my conception of forgiveness, which leads to reconciliation, requires repentance as a 
necessary pre-condition, we can see how wrongdoers can get their deserts through this. Repentance 
is difficult to do, for it takes responsibility for one’s wrong, commits oneself to no longer behaving 
as such, and attempts to make up for one’s wrong. Oftentimes, wrongdoers will feel shame and 
guilt after realizing the gravity of their wrong on top of the resentment they are already receiving 
from the victim. This shame and guilt can serve as a sort of self-punishment or penance, as it can 
torment the wrongdoer and lead him to fully understand the wrongdoing that he has committed 
and the victim that he wronged. Repentance will require such remorseful sentiments that can serve 
to restore desert. Since repentance is a requirement of forgiveness, which aims at restoring 
relationships, even if only through moral reconciliation, we can see how reconciliation can still 
deliver wrongdoers their deserts. Reconciliation is not an easy thing to earn, wrongdoers must 
prove they deserve it, thus encompassing the concept of justice as desert.  
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The justice of reconciliation even surpasses and extends wider than rights and desert in 
three ways. First, “there are certain duties that promote right relationship” and are required by the 
justice of reconciliation (Philpott 2013 405). These duties “may be defined as obligations to 
promote an end or set of ends whose discharge is open-ended with respect to the actions they 
involve” (Philpott 2013 405). While a right is a right to a particular thing, action, or protection, 
such as the right to free speech, duties are open-ended and not attached to particulars, such as a 
husband having a duty to his wife. A wife does not have a particular right to her husband doing x 
or y action, the husband may have a duty to do x or y action. Thus, the duties associated with 
promoting right relationship extend beyond rights. Secondly, the justice of right relationship 
extends beyond rights and desert when spoken of in a religious context. The reconciliation 
provided by God is often spoken of as “undeserved, not fulfilling of a right” (Philpott 2013 406). 
As Philpott argues, if God’s justice of right relationship “is a gift, then it is not a justice that is 
deserved or demanded as a right” (Philpott 2013 406). Lastly, the justice of right relationship 
extends beyond rights and desert because it “restores other wounds…that are not strictly entailed 
in the right” (Philpott 2013 406). For example, in a truth and reconciliation commission, victims 
not only receive reparation or a right to know the extent of the crimes they were victim too, but 
also receive richer and deeper benefits. Such benefits include the recognition of their suffering and 
the wrongful actions and their respect and worth being restored. These benefits extend beyond 
rights and desert and are “part of the justice of reconciliation” (Philpott 2013 407). Thus, the justice 
of reconciliation encompasses and extends beyond rights and desert.  
Forgiveness requires and participates in reconciliation and, as such, is involved in the 
justice of right relationship or reconciliation. Forgiveness brings “repair to persons and 
relationships” in five ways, in which forgiveness builds a better future for all parties (Philpott 2013 
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408). First, forgiveness “aims to overcome…the standing victory of…injustice” (Philpott 2013 
408). As argued previously, forgiveness protests and defeats the message of the wrongdoing 
through presenting a new message of equality and mutual respect. Secondly, forgiveness “restores 
the agency of the victim and “helps the victim “overcome the corrosive effects of anger and 
resentment” (Philpott 2013 410). Victims are able to restore their agency through deciding to 
commit to forgiveness to construct a better future for herself and her wrongdoer, breaking the 
power that the wrongful action held over her. Resentment and other negative reactive attitudes are 
painful and tiresome to hold, forgiveness allows the victim to rid herself of these corrosive effects 
in a way that continues to respect her worth. Thirdly, forgiveness “bring[s] restoration to the soul 
of the perpetrator” through inviting him to be something better (Philpott 2013 410). My account 
of forgiveness provides the wrongdoer ample opportunity to commit himself to his repentance and 
change of heart through constructing a better world, one in which the wrongdoer is morally 
reconciled, no longer holds the title of ‘wrongdoer,’ and is reaccepted into the moral community. 
Fourthly, forgiveness forces the parties involved to recognize the victims suffering, providing the 
victim reassurance and comfort in the sympathy of others. Lastly, forgiveness “rebuild[s] [the] 
respect for human rights” and worth that the wrongdoing diminished (Philpott 2013 411). 
Forgiving victims “will[] a relationship between him and his [wrongdoer] that involves mutual 
respect” and mutual worth (Philpott 2013 411). Thus, forgiveness achieves the justice of right 
relationship and creates a better reality for all parties involved.    
Conclusion 
 While forgiveness and punishment both accomplish the task of protesting and refuting the 
wrongful message of the wrongdoing, they do so in opposite and incompatible ways. Forgiveness 
positively restores mutual respect through restoring the worth of the victim while punishment 
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negatively restores mutual respect through lowering the worth of the wrongdoer in relation to the 
victim. If a forgiving victim were to endorse or enact punishment, a new inequality would result 
due to the restoration of her worth and diminishment of the wrongdoers worth. Further, forgiveness 
involves multiple positive actions which are incompatible with punishment. The victim will not 
be able to separate the wrong from the wrongdoer if she continues to hold the wrong against the 
wrongdoer through punishment. Also, a victim cannot claim to morally reconcile with the 
wrongdoer for the same reason. Victims also cannot welcome the wrongdoer into the moral 
community while punishing the victim, for punishment forces the wrongdoer into margins of the 
moral community by portraying them as still morally rotten. The community would be hesitant to 
reaccept a wrongdoer who is still being punished by his victim. Even wrongdoers that consent to 
punishment may not be punished by their wrongdoer after forgiveness, for this would create a 
disrespectful, sadomasochistic type of relationship that does not restore respect between the 
wrongdoer and the victim as the victim continues to be in resistance against the wrongdoer. Lastly, 
forgiveness restores the justice of right relationship, making further punishment unnecessary and 
gratuitous. In all, a victim must forgo punishment and the endorsement of punishment after 
forgiving her wrongdoer in order to maintain her forgiveness and the positive effects of it.  
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